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Inflation is often associated with a loss for the poor in the medium and long term. We
study the short-run redistributive effects of unanticipated inflation in a dynamic
optimizing sticky price model of the business cycle. Agents are heterogeneous with regard
to their age and their productivity. We emphasize three channels of the effect of inflation
on income distribution: (1) factor prices, (2) “bracket creep,” and (3) sticky pensions.
Unanticipated inflation that is caused by monetary expansion is found to reduce income
inequality. In particular, an increase of the money growth rate by one standard deviation
results in a 1% drop of the Gini coefficient of disposable income if extra tax revenues are
transferred lump-sum to the households.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The redistributive effects of inflation have been analyzed in numerous studies
of the U.S. economy. Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) provide a survey of the
empirical literature. In the majority of the studies, inflation is found to increase
income inequality. Romer and Romer (1998), Bulir (2001), and Easterly and
Fischer (2001) also point out in their empirical analysis that inflation hurts the
very poor1 in high-inflation countries. However, the evidence is inconclusive for
countries with low inflation rates.
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Using data from the Flow of Funds Account of the United States and the Survey
of Consumer Finances, Doepke and Schneider (2006b) document the effects of
inflation on holdings of nominal assets for U.S. households depending on age and
net wealth and also its distribution between the household sector, the government,
and foreigners. For this reason, they determine the amount and the maturity of
both direct and indirect nominal positions, where the latter arise through equity
holdings in businesses and investment intermediaries such as pension funds. They
show that redistribution takes the form of “ends-against-the-middle,” meaning that
the middle class gains at the expense of the rich and poor. In a simple theoreti-
cal framework of a very stylized overlapping-generations (OLG) model, Doepke
and Schneider (2006a) demonstrate that a zero-sum redistribution of wealth can
have significant aggregate effects as winners and losers may show very different
quantitative reactions to these changes. For example, a drop in wealth of a retired
worker will not have any effect on his labor supply, whereas a compensating rise
in the wealth of a working agent may reduce his labor supply, ceteris paribus.
Doepke and Schneider (2006c) use a large-scale heterogeneous-agent model with
(OLG) in order to study the quantitative aggregate and welfare effects of the wealth
redistribution. They assume that unanticipated inflation causes a change in assets
in the same way as identified in their previous empirical study [Doepke and Schnei-
der (2006b)]. To replicate the empirical wealth distribution in their model, they
allow households to hold both financial assets and housing and to leave bequests,
the government to issue nominal debt, and firms to use both physical and intangible
capital in production. As a consequence of an unanticipated inflation, the aggregate
labor supply declines, whereas aggregate savings increase. In addition, aggregate
output decreases, whereas average welfare rises.
Meh and Terajima (2008) apply the methods of Doepke and Schneider (2006b)
to study the effects of unanticipated inflation on redistribution in Canada. The
household distribution of nominal assets is similar in the United States and Canada.
However, middle-aged middle-class households are large borrowers in the United
States, whereas they are large savers in Canada. In addition, foreigners are net
lenders in the United States, whereas they are net borrowers in Canada. In accor-
dance with Doepke and Schneider (2006b), Meh and Terajima (2008) find that the
redistribution of an unanticipated increase of inflation is large. In particular, the
changes in wealth among the different age and household classes and the redis-
tribution from the households to the government sector following an unexpected
increase of 1% over five years amounts to several percentage points of GDP in
Canada. Meh et al. (2008) show that the magnitude of the redistribution depends
on monetary policy. For Canada, inflation targeting results in wealth changes that
are about three times larger than those associated with price-level targeting.
To the best of our knowledge, all these empirical studies analyze the effects
of inflation at low frequencies. Whereas most studies use the annual data set of
Deininger and Squire (1996), Doepke and Schneider (2006b, 2006c) look at a
hypothetical 10-year return of a high-inflation period that redistributes income
from the lender to the borrower among the current U.S. households. However,
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we do not know of any empirical or dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) study
that considers inflation and income inequality at business-cycle frequencies with
quarterly or monthly data. Consequently, the cyclical redistributive effects of
inflation are basically unknown.
This paper presents a DGE model that is able to study the impact of inflation on
the distribution of both income and wealth over the business cycle. Therefore, it
provides a first step to the analysis of the distributional effects of monetary policy.
Our model is an extension of a standard Neo-Keynesian model. In order to model
the short-run effects of monetary policy, we assume that prices are sticky and
adjust as in Calvo (1983). Following an unexpected rise of the money growth rate,
we observe unexpected inflation. Prices and markups adjust endogenously in our
economy. In light of the contribution of Doepke and Schneider (2006b, 2006c),
we also account for the fact that the effect of inflation on individual income and
wealth depends on age and idiosyncratic productivity. Therefore, we consider an
OLG model that is able to replicate the empirical distribution of income closely.
We emphasize three channels of the effect of inflation on income inequality: (1)
factor prices, (2) “bracket creep,” and (3) sticky pensions.
(1) Following a monetary expansion, demand goes up and factor prices increase. As a
consequence, we also observe unanticipated inflation. The increase in wages results
in higher labor income among all workers, especially among the older and more
productive workers.
(2) In addition, we model the so-called “bracket creep” effect. The tax brackets are
only adjusted to actual inflation with a lag. Therefore, if unanticipated inflation
increases, income-rich agents face higher marginal and average tax rates and inflation
redistributes income to the poor.
(3) Pensions are also indexed to actual inflation with a lag. Therefore, unanticipated
inflation reduces the income of retired workers.
In general, we find that unanticipated inflation that stems from a monetary
expansion decreases the concentration of both market income (which equals the
sum of wage, interest, and profit income) and disposable income (which equals
total after-tax income, including transfers and pensions). As one of the main
reasons, we identify the behavior of the individual labor supply in response to a
wage increase. The rise in inflation and, therefore, in demand results in an increase
of real wages. Highly productive and older workers increase their labor supply
by a larger percentage; for example, the most productive 50-year-old worker
increases his labor supply by 0.63%, whereas that of the least productive 20-year-
old worker only rises by 0.23%. The quantitative redistributive effect of inflation
on disposable income, however, depends on the modeling of the government
sector. If the government spends its extra revenues on public consumption, the
Gini coefficient of disposable income only drops by 0.014%. If, instead, extra
revenues are transferred lump-sum to the households, the drop amounts to 1.05%.
Our analysis is most closely related to the general equilibrium model of Cysne
et al. (2005), who consider a shopping-time economy. In their model, consumers
have different access to a shopping-time technology. In particular, poor agents
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cannot use interest-bearing nominal bonds to economize on transaction costs.
Accordingly, rich agents are able to pay a smaller inflation tax than poor agents.
Whereas Cysne et al. (2005), however, do not consider sticky prices and analyze
only the steady state behavior of their economy, we calibrate our DGE model and
consider the cyclical responses of income inequality to both a monetary shock and
a technology shock. In addition, we also provide for a realistic modeling of the
wealth distribution, which, of course, is important when we study the redistributive
channel of inflation that works through its effect on the return of assets.
Our paper is also related to the recent work by Erosa and Ventura (2002)
and Heer and Süssmuth (2007) on the effects of inflation on wealth inequality.
Both studies consider only changes in the long-run inflation rate that are fully
anticipated. They find that a rise in the anticipated long-run inflation rate results in
an increase of the wealth inequality. Erosa and Ventura (2002) emphasize the effect
of inflation on the composition of the consumption-good bundle. Higher inflation
results in an increase of the consumption of the credit good at the expense of the
consumption of the cash good, and richer agents have lower credit costs. Heer
and Süssmuth (2007) model the observation that not all agents have access to the
stock market and, therefore, poorer agents are less likely to hold assets whose
real return is not reduced through higher inflation. In addition, they consider the
so-called “Feldstein channel” according to which higher inflation reduces real
after-tax interest income. All these studies, however, refrain from modeling the
effects of unanticipated inflation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the OLG model.
The model is calibrated in Section 3, where we also describe the algorithm for
our computation in brief. In Section 4, we analyze the nonstochastic steady state
behavior of the model with a focus on the income and wealth distribution. Section
5 presents the results for the effects of unanticipated inflation on the distribution of
income and wealth. We distinguish the two cases where higher inflation is caused
by either a monetary expansion or a negative technology shock. Both shocks
imply the same pattern for the dynamics of inflation and disposable income. In
Section 6, we study the business-cycle behavior of our stochastic OLG model
and compare it with the corresponding representative-agent Ramsey model. In
accordance with Rı́os-Rull (1996), we find that the two models behave almost
identically with regard to the aggregate variables. Section 7 concludes. A more
detailed description of the stochastic OLG and the solution method is presented
in a separate Technical Appendix.2
2. THE MODEL
The model is based on the stochastic OLG model with elastic labor supply and
aggregate productivity risk, augmented by a government sector and the monetary
authority. The model is an extension of Rı́os-Rull (1996).
Four different sectors are depicted: households, firms, the government, and the
monetary authority. Households maximize discounted lifetime utility with regard
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to their intertemporal consumption, capital and money demand, and labor supply.
Firms in the production sector are competitive, whereas firms in the retail sector
are monopolistically competitive and set prices in a staggered way as in Calvo
(1983). The intermediate-good firms are using labor and capital as input into pro-
duction. The government taxes income progressively and spends the revenues on
government pensions, consumption, and transfers. Monetary policy is stochastic.
2.1. Households
Households live T = 240 periods (corresponding to 60 years). The first R − 1 =
160 (= 40 years) periods, they are working; the last T − (R − 1) periods (= 20
years), they are retired and receive pensions. The size of each generation s is ψs .
A member of generation s survives with probability φs to age s + 1, so that the
mass of generation s + 1 is given by
ψs+1 = φsψs. (1)
We normalize the total mass
∑T
s=1 ψs to unity.
Agents are also heterogeneous with regard to their productivity level εs,h. The
productivity εs,h depends on the age s and the productivity type h ∈ {1, . . . , m}
at birth. Individual productivity is nonstochastic, and individuals will not change
their productivity type h over their lifetime. The share of type-h agents in each
generation is constant and denoted by νh.
The s-year-old household with productivity type h holds real money holdings
xt,s,h/Pt and capital kt,s,h at period t . It maximizes expected lifetime utility in
period t with regard to consumption ct,s,h, labor supply nt,s,h, next-period money
















, 1 − ntj ,j,h
)
, tj := t + j − s, (2)
where β is a discount factor and expectations Et are conditioned on the information
















1 − σ + η0
(1 − n)1−η
1 − η , (3)
where σ > 0 denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.3 The agent is born
without capital kt,1,h = 0, h ∈ {1, . . . , m}, but receives an initial cash endowment
from the government xt,1,h that is fixed in terms of the beginning of period price
level Pt−1.
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The s-year-old working agent with productivity type h faces the following
nominal budget constraint in period t :
Pt(kt+1,s+1,h − (1 − δ)kt,s,h)+ (xt+1,s+1,h − xt,s,h)+ Ptct,s,h






s = 1, . . . , T , h = 1 . . . , m.
The working agent receives income from effective labor εs,hnt,s,h and capital
kt,s,h as well as government transfers trt and profits ωt,s,h, which is spent on
consumption ct,s,h, next-period capital kt+1,s+1,h, and money xt+1,s+1,h. wt and rt
denote the real wage rate per effective labor and the real interest rate, respectively.
If the agent does not survive until period t + 1, his or her wealth is collected by
the government.4
We assume that aggregate profits t are distributed to households according to
their shares in aggregate wealth,ωt,s,h = κs,ht . Yet, because younger households
may find it optimal to lend against future income, we restrict the distribution to
households with positive assets. Furthermore, because our solution procedure
(log-linearization at the balanced growth path) cannot deal with abrupt changes
from negative to positive wealth, we use the shares that apply in the stationary
equilibrium of our model. Thus, the shares of aggregate profits κs,h received by a
household of age s and productivity type h equal










where ks,h are the capital holdings of the s-year-old household with productivity
type h in the nonstochastic steady state.
The household pays taxes on its nominal income Ptyt,s,h:
Ptyt,s,h = Pt(rt − δ)kt,s,h + Ptwtεs,hnt,s,h + Ptωt,s,h.
In particular, the capital income–taxation scheme provides for a depreciation
allowance.
The government collects taxes from nominal-income, but only adjusts the
nominal-income tax schedule to the actual price level with a lag of n ∈ {0, 1, . . . }
quarters, where n = 0 is perfect indexation. Therefore, nominal income is de-
flated by P It := πnPt−n, where π denotes the nonstochastic inflation factor in the
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Notice that when we have high inflation, πt = Pt/Pt−1 > π , the real tax burden
increases as the agent’s real income moves into a higher tax bracket, the so-called
“bracket creep” effect.
The nominal budget constraint of the retired worker is given by
Pt(kt+1,s+1,h − (1 − δ)kt,s,h)+ (xt+1,s+1,h − xt,s,h)+ Ptct,s,h











s = R, . . . , T , h = 1, . . . , m,
with the capital stock and money balances at the end of life at age s = T being
equal to zero, kt,T ,h = xt,T ,h ≡ 0, for all productivity types h ∈ {1, . . . , m},
because the household does not leave bequests. Furthermore, because retirement
at age R is mandatory, nt,R,h = nt,R+1,h = . . . = nt,T ,h ≡ 0. Pensions penh
depend on the productivity type h. Households with higher contributions to the
pension system will receive higher pensions.5 Again, the government adjusts
nominal pension payments in each period with a lag of n periods. If inflation is
higher than average, πt > π , the real value of pensions declines. Accordingly,






(1 + rt − δ)kt,s,h + mt,s,h
πt
+ wtεs,hnt,s,h + trt + ωt,s,h
−τt,s,h − ct,s,h, for s = 1, . . . , R − 1,
(1 + rt − δ)kt,s,h + mt,s,h
πt
+ Pent,s,h + trt + ωt,s,h
−τt,s,h − ct,s,h, for s = R, . . . , T ,
, (8)
where we define mt,s,h ≡ xt,x,h/Pt−1.
The necessary conditions for the households with respect to consumption ct,s,h,
s = 1, . . . , R−1, next-period capital kt+1,s+1,h, and next-period moneymt+1,s+1,h
at age s = 1, . . . , T − 1 in period t are as follows:
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The optimal labor supply of the productivity h–type workers at age s = 1, . . . , R−
1 is determined by
η0(1 − nt,s,h)−η = λt,s,h
[
























The monetary authority imperfectly monitors the growth rate (θt − 1) of this
aggregate and transfers the seignorage Seignt to the government. Thus,




= (θt − 1)Xt
Pt







h=1 ψsνhmt,s,h. The percentage deviation of θt from its
nonstochastic mean θ follows





where a circumflex over a variable denotes the percentage deviation of the variable
from its steady state value and εθt is assumed to be i.i.d., εθt ∼ N(0, σ 2θ ).
Our definition ofMt , together with the assumptions regarding monetary policy,





A continuum of perfectly competitive firms produce the final output using differ-
entiated intermediate goods distributed on [0,1]. These goods are manufactured
by monopolistically competitive firms. Firms in the intermediate goods sector set
prices according to Calvo (1983).
Final goods firms. The firms in the final goods sector produce the final good
with a constant–returns to scale technology using the intermediate goods Yt (j),
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Intermediate goods firms. The intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] is produced with
capital Kt(j) and effective labor Nt(j) according to
Yt (j) = ZtKt(j)αNt(j)1−α, (21)
where Zt denotes a productivity shock, whose unconditional expectation equals
Z = 1. Off the balanced-growth path the log of Zt is governed by
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + εZt , (22)
where εZt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σZ .
The firms chooseKt(j) and Nt(j) in order to maximize profits. In a symmetric
equilibrium, profit maximization by the intermediate goods producers implies
rt = gtαZtKα−1t N1−αt , (23)
wt = gt (1 − α)ZtKαt N−αt , (24)
where gt denotes the inverse of the markup.
2.4. Price Setting
Prices are set according to the mechanism spelled out in Calvo (1983). In each
period (1 − ϕ) of the firms in the intermediate goods sector are allowed to set
their relative price Pt(j)/Pt optimally. Depending on the assumptions about the
information set and the adjustment rule for the remaining fraction of firms, we
consider three different settings.
(1) A purely forward-looking Phillips curve arises if the price -setters choose their optimal
relative price after the realization of the monetary shock and if the other firms (with
index N ) adjust their price according to
PNt (j) = πPNt−1(j).
Profit maximization by symmetric firms leads to a condition that can be expressed as
a dynamic equation for the aggregate inflation rate:6
0 = π̂t − βEt π̂t+1 − (1 − ϕ)(1 − βϕ)
ϕ
ĝt . (25)
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(2) If we assume instead that nonoptimizing firms set their prices according to
PNt (j) = πt−1PNt−1(j),
the log-linear Phillips curve becomes
0 = π̂t − 1
1 + β π̂t−1 −
β
1 + β Et π̂t+1 −
(1 − ϕ)(1 − βϕ)
(1 + β)ϕ ĝt . (26)
(3) Finally, if the firms must set their optimal price before the realization of the money
supply shock, equation (26) turns to
0 = π̂t − 1
1 + β π̂t−1 −
β
1 + β Et−1π̂t+1 −
(1 − ϕ)(1 − βϕ)
(1 + β)ϕ Et−1ĝt . (27)
2.5. Government
Nominal government expenditures in period t consist of pensions Pent , the money
endowment of the first generation, government consumption Gt , and lump-sum
transfers Trt to households. Government expenditures are financed by an income
tax Taxt , accidental bequests Beqt , and seignorage Seignt :






= Taxt + Beqt + Seignt . (28)
The income tax structure is chosen to match the current income tax structure in the
United States most closely.7 Gouveia and Strauss (1994) have characterized the
U.S. effective income tax function in the year 1989 with the following function:
τ(y) = a0
[






(1) Aggregate and individual behavior are consistent; i.e., the sum of individual con-
sumption, effective labor supply, capital, and money is equal to the aggregate level



















where the sum of the individual money balances is defined in (13).
(2) Households maximize lifetime utility (2).
(3) Firms maximize profits.
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(4) The goods market clears:
Yt = ZtKαt N 1−αt = Ct +Gt +Kt+1 + (1 − δ)Kt .
(5) Technology is governed by the AR(1)-process (22).
(6) Aggregate profits in the intermediate goods sector amount to
t = (1 − gt )Yt . (31)
(7) The government budget (28) balances.






(1 − φs)ψsνh(kt+1,s+1,h +mt+1,s+1,h). (32)
















(10) Monetary growth (16) is stochastic and seignorage is transferred to the government.
The nonstochastic steady state and the log-linearization of the model at the
nonstochastic steady state are described in more detail in the Technical Appendix
to this paper.
3. CALIBRATION AND COMPUTATION
The OLG model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the U.S. postwar
economy. We use standard values for the parameters of the model. Periods corre-
spond to quarters. The firstR−1 = 160 periods, agents are working; the remaining
T − (R − 1) = 80 periods, they are retired. We distinguish two scenarios for the
fiscal policy depending on the share ξ ∈ {0, 1} of the excess government revenues
that are spent on public consumption (versus government transfers). In the first
scenario , ξ = 1, all extra revenues are spent on government consumption. We will
refer to this case as our benchmark in the following. In the second scenario, ξ = 0,
government consumption is zero and all excess revenues are spent on lump-sum
transfers to the households. In this section, we use a superscript ξ ∈ {0, 1} for the
parameters {γ, η0} that are sensitive with regard to the fiscal policy.
3.1. Preferences
β is set equal to 0.9975, implying an annual capital–output ratio of about 2.0,
which is almost independent of our choice of ξ ∈ {0, 1}. For this choice, the
nonstochastic steady state annual real rate of return before taxes amounts to 7.4%.
The relative risk-aversion coefficient σ is set equal to 2.0. We choose η = 7.0,
which implies a conservative value of 0.3 for the Frisch labor-supply elasticity.9
η00 = 0.19 (η10 = 0.60) is set so that the average labor supply in the economy is
approximately equal to 1/3 in the two scenarios ξ ∈ {0, 1}. γ is chosen so that
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TABLE 1. Parameterization of the OLG model
Demographics T = 160 T R = 80
Preferences β = 0.9975 σ = 2.0 γ 0 = 0.9775 γ 1 = 0.9740
η00 = 0.19 η10 = 0.60 η = 7.0
Productivity types m = 3 σ 2z = 3.60
Production α = 0.36 δ = 0.019 ρZ = 0.95 σZ = 0.007
Market structure ε = 6.0 ϕ = 0.25
Money supply π = 1.013 ρθ = 0.49 σθ = 0.0089
Government ζ = 0.5 a0 = 0.258 a1 = 0.768 τ(Y − δK)
Y − δK = 0.104
the (annualized) average velocity of money PY/M is equal to the velocity of M1
during 1960–2002, PY/M = 6.0. This requires γ 1 = 0.9740 (γ 0 = 0.9775) in
the scenario ξ = 1 (ξ = 0). Table 1 summarizes our choice of parameters.
3.2. Individual Productivity
The idiosyncratic productivity level is given by εs,h = eȳs+zh , where ȳs is the mean
lognormal income of the s-year-old and zh is the idiosyncratic component. The
mean efficiency index ȳs of the s-year-old is taken from Hansen (1993) and is
interpolated to in-between quarters. As a consequence, the model replicates the
cross-section age distribution of earnings of the U.S. economy. The productivity
age profile is hump-shaped and earnings peak at age 50, corresponding to model
period 121 (not displayed). With regard to the idiosyncratic component zh, we
follow Huggett (1996) and choose a log-normal distribution of earnings for the
20-year-old with a variance equal to σ 2z = 3.60. By this choice, the Gini coefficient
of market income is equal to 0.55 and matches the empirical value estimated by
Budrı́a-Rodriguez et al. (2002) exactly. The productivity state zh is equally spaced
and ranges from −σz to σz. We discretize the state space using m = 3 values and





Pensions depend only on productivity type h. Following İmrohoroğlu et al. (1995),
we choose a replacement ratio of pensions relative to average net wage earnings
ζ equal to 50%, ζ = Penh/(1 − τ̄ )wn̄h. τ̄ is the income tax rate on the average









is the average effective labor supply of productivity type h over his or her working
life, also computed from the labor supply in the nonstochastic equilibrium.
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Gouveia and Stauss (1994) characterize the U.S. effective income tax in the year
1989 with the function (29) and estimate its parameters as a0 = 0.258, a1 = 0.786,
and a2 = 0.031. We need to adjust this function to our model, because we assume
quarterly tax payments and because the units of income y in our model differ
from those in the United States. We assume that the average tax rate on annual
income equals the average tax rate on quarterly income, and that the average tax
rate in our model equals the average tax rate on the average U.S. income in 1989,
yUS = 36,173 [taken from Table A.1 of Gouveia and Strauss (1994)]:










Solving this equation for ã2 yields our adjusted tax schedule:
τ(y) = a0y − a0(y−a1 + ã2)
−1
a1 ,
ã2 = a2 (4yus/y)a1 .
(34)
Note that the average income y in our model itself depends on the tax schedule.
Therefore, we must adjust ã2 in each step of our iterative computation of the
stationary equilibrium (as described below) until convergence is achieved.
As an alternative taxation scenario, we consider the case of a flat income tax
rate. In this case, we use the tax rate τ = 10.4%, which implies the same tax burden
for the average income as in the case of progressive taxation. In the nonstochastic
steady state of our model, the average income amounts toY−δK (see the Technical
Appendix for a detailed description of the nonstochastic steady state).
3.4. Monetary Authority
In accordance with Cooley and Hansen (1995), the quarterly inflation factor is set
equal to π = 1.013. Money growth follows an AR(1)-process. For the postwar
U.S. economy, Cooley and Hansen estimate ρθ = 0.49 and σ 2θ = 0.0089. The ini-
tial endowments of money,m1,h, for the different productivity types h = 1, . . . , m
are chosen to equal those of the one-quarter-older individuals of the same pro-
ductivity type.
3.5. Production
The production elasticity of capital, α = 0.36, and the quarterly depreciation
rate δ = 0.019 are taken from Prescott (1986) and Cooley and Hansen (1995),
respectively. The value for the depreciation rate implies an annual investment–
capital ratio equal to 0.076. In our analysis, we consider three different scenarios
for the degree of price flexibility, using fractions ϕ of producers, that do not
adjust their prices in any quarter from the set {0, 0.25, 0.75}. The value of ϕ = 0
represents the case of perfect price flexibility. ϕ = 0.25 implies that prices change
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about every four months. This is in line with evidence provided by Bils and Klenow
(2004) and Klenow and Kryvstov (2008). The more usual value of ϕ = 0.75 is
used in many studies that either exclude capital or introduce considerable costs of
capital stock adjustment. With flexible capital, as in our model, this value produces
so much price stickiness that output fluctuations are implausibly high. Therefore,
and if not mentioned otherwise, the results presented below refer to ϕ = 0.25.
Following empirical evidence presented by Basu and Fernard (1997), we set
the average markup at the amount 1/g = 1.2, implying a constant elasticity of
substitution between any two intermediate goods equal to ε = 6.0.
The log of the aggregate technology shock follows an AR(1) process (22) with
autoregressive parameter ρZ = 0.95 and standard deviation σZ = 0.007, as in
Cooley and Prescott (1995).
3.6. Computation
In order to compute business cycle dynamics of the model, we first need to compute
the nonstochastic steady state of the model. Second, we log-linearize the model
around the nonstochastic steady state.
The nonstochastic steady state is computed by solving the respective system of
nonlinear equations consisting of the first-order conditions of the generation born
at time t , the government’s budget constraint, the firms’ first-order conditions,
and the aggregate consistency conditions. In the case of m = 3, this is a system
of 2,634 variables. We employ a nonlinear equation solver that takes care of the
admissible bounds within which the solution must lie. To obtain reasonable initial
values, we started with a simplified version of our model without money and
endogenous labor supply, where it is easy to solve for the optimal time profile of
the capital stock. We expanded this model in several steps to the model presented
above. The Technical Appendix provides additional details on the various models.
Thereafter, we log-linearize the model around the nonstochastic steady state and
solve the ensuing linear rational-expectations model as explained in the Technical
Appendix.
4. ASSET AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE NONSTOCHASTIC
STEADY STATE
We present our results in the following three sections. Before we describe the
redistributive effects of unanticipated inflation and the business-cycle properties
in the next two sections, we first present the behavior of the variables in the non-
stochastic steady state in this section. We pay particular attention to the distribution
of the assets and income.
In the nonstochastic steady state, inflation and the technology level are constant.
Figure 1 displays the consumption, savings, and labor supply profiles for ages 20
through 80 in our benchmark economy with government consumption. The x-
axis displays age in lifetime years. The capital–age profile is hump-shaped, as
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FIGURE 1. Stationary equilibrium, budget surplus spent on government consumption.
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displayed in the upper left graph in Figure 1. Notice that due to the hump-shaped
productivity–age profile (shown in the lower right panel), medium- and high-
productivity households dissave during the first three and six years, respectively.
Only at real lifetime ages 23 and 26 do household start to build up positive savings.
Agents with higher productivity attain higher levels of capital, money balances,
and consumption. In addition, consumption and, therefore, money balances are
decreasing during old age because the survival probabilities decline and utility is
discounted at a higher rate.
Notice that the household behavior changes as households enter retirement and
real money balances display a small drop. This kind of behavior is absent from
most standard OLG models. The reason is the presence of progressive income
taxation in our model. In the nonstochastic long-run equilibrium, the first-order
conditions (10) and (11) can be condensed to
ms+1,h
θ






Because the marginal tax rate τ ′(·) depends on income, the strict proportionality
between consumption and the stock of real money balances observed in models
with a constant tax rate breaks down. In particular, because the marginal tax rate
drops markedly when the household retires, it readjusts its portfolio, giving rise
to the sudden drop in his money stock.
As can be seen from the lower left graph of Figure 1, labor supply is almost
constant during the first 10 years, during which individual productivity is charac-
terized by a steep increase (consider the broken lines in the lower left and right
panels for the high-productivity workers). Around age 30, labor supply starts to
decline significantly and is close to half its initial value at the age of retirement for
the high-productivity agents (the lower labor supply curve in the bottom left panel).
The decline in the labor supply reflects the increasing wealth effect as agents build
up savings. Also note the clear ranking in the labor supply–age profiles, with low-
productivity workers on the top and high-productivity workers at the bottom.11
In our model, income and wealth are distributed unequally. The inequality of
the income distribution is in good accordance with that observed empirically. As
pointed out in the previous section, the standard deviation of log productivity has
been calibrated so that the Gini coefficient of market income is equal to 0.55. Em-
pirically, wealth is much more concentrated than income. In the 1998 SCF sample,
Budrı́a Rodriguez et al. (2002) find a Gini coefficient of wealth equal to 0.803 for
the U.S. economy. In our model, the Gini coefficient of wealth only amounts to
0.65. Although our model is able to replicate the wealth distribution in the four
lowest quintiles, it does a poor job in replicating the wealth concentration of the
top percentile.12 To replicate the wealth distribution of the richest 1%, one has to
introduce entrepreneurship, as in Quadrini (2000), or preference heterogeneity, as
in Krusell and Smith (1998). Finally, the correlation of market income (disposable
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income) and wealth amounts to 0.79 (0.85) in our model, as compared to the
empirical value of 0.60 reported by Budrı́a Rodrı́guez et al. (2002).
5. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF UNANTICIPATED INFLATION
In this section, we describe the dynamics of the distribution following a monetary
shock and a technology shock.
5.1. Redistributive Effects of Monetary Policy
An expansionary monetary shock increases demand, either directly, because the
government spends the seignorage on consumption, or indirectly, via transfers
to the households. As prices are sticky and firms are monopolistic competitors
in the intermediate goods sector, output and employment increase. The impulse
response functions of aggregate variables to a monetary growth shock εθ,2 = σθ in
period 2 (and zero thereafter) are presented in Figure 2 for the case where pensions
and taxes are indexed for one year (n = 4) and where the excess of government
revenues over pensions are spent on goods. Moreover, prices are moderately sticky
(ϕ = 0.25) and are set according to the Phillips curve (26), which also contains a
backward-looking component. We will refer to this case as our benchmark model
in the following.
In the first row of Figure 2, the percentage deviations of the variables money
growth rate θt , output Yt , consumption Ct , and investment It are graphed. In the
second row, we illustrate the percentage deviations of government spending Gt ,
hours, real money Mt , and the inflation factor πt . In the third row, we have the
behavior of marginal costs gt (the inverse of the markup), profitst , the user costs
of capital rt , and the wage rate wt . The dotted lines display the impulse responses
from the representative-agent version of our model. This model is outlined in the
Technical Appendix and has been calibrated so that the capital–output ratio, the
income velocity of money, and average working hours in the nonstochastic steady
state of the model equal the respective quantities in the OLG model.
The percentage changes of output and hours are moderate and amount to 0.30
and 0.34%, respectively, whereas the drop in investment by 4.2% is more pro-
nounced. This reflects the crowding out of private expenditures by the huge in-
crease of government consumption of about 7% and the agent’s desire to smooth
consumption. Inflation, the user costs of capital, and wages all increase, whereas
profits decrease. Our OLG model inherits the behavior of almost all of its variables
from the representative-agent model. The most noticeable differences concern
consumption and investment. In the OLG model, consumption decreases by 0.09
percent in the period of the shock, which is about 50% larger than the response
in the representative-agent model. Furthermore, in the OLG model, investment
drops about 5.4% below its stationary value in the second period after the shock,
which is about 0.8 percentage points larger than the response in the representative
agent model. Also, notice that many variables strongly undershoot in the second
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FIGURE 3. Distributional effects of a monetary shock, Trt = 0.
period after the shock. This is a consequence of the lagged adjustment of inflation.
It disappears in the model with the Phillips curve (25) and a more moderate degree
of indexation (n = 1).
In order to understand the contribution of the various transmission channels
of monetary policy to the distribution, we have computed the model for various
cases, starting from the OLG model with flexible prices, proportional taxes, and
no indexation of pensions and taxes and adding one new element each time: sticky
prices, tax progression, and indexation of taxes and pensions.
In the upper left panel of Figure 3, we see that the effect of a monetary shock
on market income in an economy with flexible prices and proportional taxes
(the solid line) is basically zero: a one-standard-deviation increase of the money
growth factor, σθ = 0.89, increases the Gini coefficient of market income by
0.004% and the Gini coefficient of disposable income by 0.005%. Even though
these changes are extremely small, it helps to to trace the different sources of this
slightly more unequal distribution in order to understand the working of the full
model.
First, the responsiveness of the individual labor supply to wage increases de-
pends on age and the productivity type [see the lower right panel of Figure 4,
where the wage elasticity (1 − ns,h)/ηns,h is plotted]. The most productive old
workers—who are also the richest in the population—are very sensitive to wage
changes, and thus increase their labor supply relatively more than young and low-
productivity workers. Second, in the case of flexible prices, the shock increases
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100510000490
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaet Augsburg, on 22 Aug 2017 at 06:41:52, subject to the Cambridge Core
THE BURDEN OF UNANTICIPATED INFLATION 297
FIGURE 4. Impulse response of working hours to a monetary shock, n = 4, Trt = 0.
aggregate profits (not illustrated) and, thus, the market income of the rich agents.
And third, the user cost of capital increases on impact. All three effects increase
the market income of the older and more productive workers to a larger extent
than that of the younger and less productive workers.
Next, consider what happens if prices are sticky (the broken line in Figure 3).
Both the wage effect and the effect from the user costs of capital are still operative.
What makes the difference, and thus accounts for the more equal distribution of
market income in the first period of the shock, is the huge drop in aggregate profits
by over 7%. In the first period after the shock, the price adjustment restores profits
and real wages decrease, which explains the increase of the Gini coefficient of
market income in this period.
In the model with a progressive tax schedule, the monetary shock induces a
more unequal distribution of market income in the first period. At first sight,
this seems counterintuitive, because the same mechanisms are at work. However,
considering the stationary distribution of capital shares and the stationary age-
profile of labor supply resolves the puzzle. First, in the case of a progressive
rather than a proportional tax schedule, the high-productivity workers build up
less capital relative to the low- and medium-productivity workers, and thus the
gap between the individual capital shares narrows. Accordingly, the distribution
of income and wealth is more equal in the economy with progressive taxation.
For this reason, the drop of aggregate profits has a much smaller negative (in
terms of the change of the Gini coefficient) distributional effect on market income.
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FIGURE 5. Impulse response of capital to a monetary shock, n = 4, Trt = 0.
Second, in comparison to the case of the proportional income tax, the labor supply
elasticity of the low- and medium-productivity workers at ages 40–60 is higher,
so that labor supply reacts more strongly in response to a monetary expansion.
As a consequence, the wage increase favors the market income in this age group.
The upper right panel of Figure 3 reveals that the progressive tax system reverses
the impact of the shock on the distribution of market income. The distribution of
disposable income becomes more equal (the solid line with squares).
The imperfect indexation of taxes and pensions reduces the impact effect of the
money shock on the distribution of market income (see the solid line with dots
in the upper left panel of Figure 3) because the marginal tax rates of the more
productive workers increase with inflation. Because the real wage rate drops below
its stationary value in the second period, the pattern of labor income change is
reversed in the next period, and the distribution of market income becomes more
equal. The imperfect indexation of taxes and pensions also strengthens the impact
of the money shock on the distribution of disposable income as the real tax burden
of richer agents increases and the real value of their pensions declines. The Gini
coefficient of disposable income drops by 0.15% and remains below its stationary
value for three more quarters.
The more equal distribution of disposable income translates into a more equal
distribution of wealth in the first quarter of the shock (t = 3). Yet the savings
behavior reverses this effect in the following quarters. In Figure 5, we plot the
percentage changes of the capital stock for those aged between 40 and 70, i.e.,
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FIGURE 6. Impulse response of capital to a monetary shock, n = 4, Gt = 0.
the relatively rich individuals in each productivity group. The upper right panel
shows that the relative amount of dissaving increases with productivity and age.
This explains the narrowing of the wealth distribution in the first period after
the shock. However, starting in the second period after the shock (t = 4), we
see that the changes in the savings–age profile of the most productive agents
are upward-sloping until retirement. Thus, the younger agents reduce their wealth
more than the older and richer agents, so that the wealth distribution becomes more
unequal.
In the Technical Appendix to this paper, we also consider the case where the
government redistributes its additional income from bequests, seignorage, and
taxes as a lump sum to the households. Here, we only report the results from
this exercise. The impulse responses of the Gini coefficients for market income,
disposable income, and wealth are graphed in Figure 6. Evidently, we find much
stronger effects in the model without government consumption. An increase of
the money growth rate by one standard deviation reduces the Gini coefficient of
disposable income in the model with all nominal frictions by 1.05% in the first
period. Half of this drop is explained by the indexation of taxes and pensions. The
Gini ratio of wealth displays a U-shaped response with its trough at 0.21% below
the stationary value, occurring five quarters after the shock.
The importance of the tax and transfer system is also highlighted by the cyclical
behavior of the income share of the poorest 10% of the population. As we have
explained, if the government spends its extra income solely on consumption, the
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decrease of the Gini ratio of disposable income is mainly driven by the income
losses of the richer part of the population. Accordingly, the income share of the
first decile drops 1.8% below its stationary value in the second period of the shock.
If, however, the government redistributes its extra income to the households as a
lump sum, the Gini ratio of disposable rises and peaks at 5.4% above its stationary
value in the first period before it, thereafter, slowly returns to its stationary value
(not illustrated).
5.2. Inflation and Distribution Dynamics After a Technology Shock
Figure 7 displays the response of key variables following a technology shock of
one standard deviation (0.7%) in period 2. The responses in the OLG model (solid
line) are almost identical to those in the corresponding Ramsey model (broken
line), with minor difference only between those of consumption, investment, and
government spending.
Following an increase in the technology level, the marginal products of capital
and labor increase. As a consequence, investment and production rise. The effect
of the technology shock on individual labor supply is ambiguous, as illustrated in
Figure 8. Younger workers decrease their labor supply in period 2, whereas older
workers even supply more hours (the upper right panel). Again, this behavior can
be explained by the labor supply elasticity, which is highest for the older and
high-productivity workers. In addition, we have a strong wealth effect that results
from the increase in total income.13 When inflation adjusts and real wages increase
even further, all age groups supply more labor.
Figure 9 displays the impulse responses of the Gini ratios of market income,
disposable income, and wealth. The three channels identified in the previous
paragraph account for the more unequal distribution of market income in response
to a technology shock: the richer agents supply relatively more labor, earn more
capital income, and receive more dividends. Notice that the tax and pension
system is not able to reverse this pattern. In particular, the Gini coefficient of
disposable income increases by 0.05% above its stationary value. Accordingly,
the co-movement of inflation and disposable income inequality is the same as
in the case of a monetary shock. In response to a positive technology shock,
inflation decreases while inequality of disposable income increases. In the case
of a positive monetary shock, inflation increases and, again, disposable income
inequality moves in the opposite direction, i.e., it decreases.
Even though the distribution of disposable income becomes more unequal after a
positive technology shock, the distribution of wealth becomes more equal because
(1) low- and medium-productivity workers increase their savings relatively more
than high-productivity workers (the substitution effect of higher returns on capital
dominates the income effect), (2) the changes in the savings–age profile (not
shown) decrease between ages 40 and 55 (due to the wealth effect), and (3)
all retired workers reduce their savings markedly. As a consequence, the Gini
coefficient of wealth declines by 0.09% over the next five years (= twenty periods).
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FIGURE 8. Impulse response of working hours to a technology shock, n = 4, Trt = 0.
6. BUSINESS-CYCLE PROPERTIES OF THE OLG MODEL
In this section, we first compare the behavior of the variables of our OLG model
with that of those of the U.S. economy. We will pay special attention to the cyclical
behavior of the distribution measures. In the second part, we compare the OLG
model with the corresponding representative-agent model.
6.1. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents the second moments of a few key variables for the U.S. economy
and compares them to those of the OLG model. The estimates for the U.S. economy
are taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995) (for all real variables) and from Cooley
and Hansen (1995) and Cooley and Quadrini (1999) (for inflation). Although the
volatility of investment relative to output in our model is much larger than that in
the data, hours and consumption display too little volatility. In addition, real wages
and inflation fluctuate too much in our model. The correlations of the variables
with output except for hours and investment are in good accordance with the
observations from the US economy.
In Table 3 we present second moments of the Gini ratios of disposable income
and wealth. We compare two different economies. The first economy is hit by
both technology and monetary shocks, whereas the second economy is driven
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FIGURE 9. Distributional effects of a technology shock, n = 4, Trt = 0.
by technology shocks only. If the government transfers its excess revenues as a
lump sum to the household sector (ξ = 0), monetary policy shocks contribute
considerably to the volatility of the income distribution. By stabilizing money
growth (i.e., by setting σθ = 0), the standard deviation of the Gini ratio of
disposable income drops from 1.39 to 0.15. In the model where excess revenues
TABLE 2. Second moments: U.S. data vs. the OLG model (ϕ = 0.25,
ξ = 1)
U.S. data OLG model
sx/sy rxy sx/sy rxy
Output sy = 1.72 1.00 sy = 1.06 1.00
Consumption 0.74 0.83 0.34 0.85
Investment 4.79 0.91 7.96 0.53
Hours 0.92 0.86 0.40 0.49
Real wage 0.44 0.68 1.66 0.76
Inflation 0.35 0.34 1.66 0.26
Notes: Second moments in the OLG model from HP-filtered simulated time series. The numbers
are averages from 100 simulations. The length of each indivdual time series is 150 quarters.
sx = standard deviation of variable x, rxy = cross correlation of variable x with output.
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TABLE 3. Cyclical behavior of Gini ratios
With monetary Without monetary
shock shock
ξ = 0 ξ = 1 ξ = 0 ξ = 1
syd 1.39 0.21 0.15 0.07
rydy 0.12 0.21 0.64 0.90
sw 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.05
rwy 0.08 −0.14 0.04 −0.13
Notes: Second moments from HP-filtered simulated time series. The numbers
are averages from 100 simulations. The length of each individual time se-
ries is 150 quarters. syd = standard deviation of Gini ratio of disposable in-
come, ryd y = cross-correlation of Gini ratio of disposable income with output,
sw= standard deviation of Gini ratio of wealth, rwy = cross correlation of Gini
ratio of wealth with output.
are spent on government consumption (ξ = 1), this effect is less dramatic but
still significant: the standard deviation of the Gini ratio is reduced from 0.21 to
0.07. Also note that without money supply shocks the concentration of the income
distribution is procyclical, independent of the share of government consumption ξ .
In the economy with both monetary and technological disturbances the opposing
effects on the distribution of income result in an almost acyclical distribution. The
distribution of wealth is unrelated to the business cycle, because the respective
correlations coefficients are small in all four economies considered in Table 3.
6.2. Comparison with the Corresponding Representative-Agent Model
Table 4 compares the second moments from our OLG model with those from a
representative-agent version of this model. It confirms the result from the analysis
of the model’s impulse responses in Figures 2 and 7 that there are only minor
differences between the two models. The most obvious case concerns investment,
which is more volatile in the OLG model, and even more so in the case ξ = 1.
In accordance with Rios-Rull (1996), who studies a much simpler nonmonetary
OLG model, we find that if one is interested only in the study of the behavior
of aggregate variables, the representative-agent model generates almost the same
results as the OLG model and, of course, is much easier to compute and, therefore,
is the tool of choice.
7. CONCLUSION
Our study provides an initial step toward the understanding of the distributional
effects of monetary policy over the business cycle. So far, only the long-run
distribution effects of monetary policy have been analyzed in computable general
equilibrium models, such as Erosa and Ventura (2002), Cysne et al. (2005), or Heer
and Süssmuth (2007). The effect of unexpected inflation on the distribution of
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TABLE 4. OLG versus representative-agent (RA) model
OLG model RA model
sx rxy rx sx rxy rx
ξ = 0
Output 0.97 1.00 0.65 0.95 1.00 0.66
Consumption 0.39 0.94 0.73 0.42 0.95 0.72
Investment 4.35 0.99 0.58 4.07 0.99 0.60
Hours 0.40 0.28 −0.20 0.42 0.31 −0.18
Real wage 1.67 0.70 −0.08 1.68 0.68 −0.08
Inflation 1.61 0.11 −0.04 1.61 0.10 −0.04
ξ = 1
Output 1.06 1.00 0.57 0.98 1.00 0.64
Consumption 0.36 0.85 0.75 0.39 0.92 0.74
Investment 8.46 0.53 0.71 6.88 0.52 0.69
Hours 0.43 0.49 −0.32 0.45 0.39 −0.26
Real wage 1.77 0.76 −0.09 1.80 0.70 −0.10
Inflation 1.76 0.26 −0.04 1.75 0.18 −0.04
Notes: Second moments from HP-filtered simulated time series. The numbers are averages from
100 simulations. The length of each individual time series is 150 quarters. sx = standard deviation
of variable x, rxy = cross correlation of variable x with output, rx = first-order autocorrelation of
variable x.
income and wealth has not received attention in any dynamic general equilibrium
model as yet.
We present a model that replicates the following important channels of the
effects of monetary policy on the distribution of income and wealth: (1) the
response of prices, and hence the change in the markups, interest rates, wages, and,
ultimately the factor incomes of the individuals, (2) the “bracket creep” effect, and
(3) inflation-dependent pensions. In our model, an expansionary monetary shock
is found to decrease the inequality of both the distribution of factor income and
disposable income after the first period of the shock, even though only to a small
extent. A much larger effect arises if the government redistributes its additional
revenues from seignorage and taxes lump sum to the households: Following a
monetary shock of one standard deviation, the Gini ratio of disposable income
immediately drops by 1.05% below its stationary value as compared to only 0.15%
in our benchmark model. Half of this effect is accounted for by the imperfect
indexation of tax brackets and pensions for inflation.
Our framework can only be regarded as a first step to a full-fledged analysis
of the short-run distribution effects of monetary policy. We emphasize the role of
cash holdings and neglect the distribution of nominal asset price positions, and in
particular of nominal fixed-income bonds. As described by Doepke and Schneider
(2006b, 2006c), young middle-class households are the main beneficiaries of
unanticipated inflation, as they are net nominal borrowers due to their mortgage
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debt. Nevertheless, our analysis can serve as a benchmark case for future work that
may consider a more sophisticated model with additional assets besides money
and capital, namely housing and nominal bonds.
NOTES
1. When we talk about the poor, we refer to the income-poor if not mentioned otherwise.
2. The Technical Appendix is available upon request from the authors.
3. We follow Castañeda et al. (2003) in our choice of a functional form for the utility from leisure.
In particular, this additive functional form implies a relatively low variability of working hours across
individuals that is in good accordance with empirical evidence.
4. In the Technical Appendix, we also consider briefly the case of perfect annuity markets. However,
in this case the consumption–age profile is upward-sloping and not hump-shaped, as empirically
observed. Therefore, we focus on the case of unintended bequests.
5. The details of the pension scheme are explained in Section 3.3.
6. Maußner (2010) provides detailed derivations of the different log-linear Phillips curves encoun-
tered in the literature.
7. In the Appendix and in our simulations, we also consider the case of a proportional income tax.
8. See the Technical Appendix for the derivation of this definition.
9. The estimates of the Frisch intertemporal labor supply elasticity ηn,w implied by microecono-
metric studies and the implied values of γ vary considerably. MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) both
use PSID data to estimate values of 0.23 and 0.28, respectively, whereas Killingsworth (1983) finds a
U.S. labor supply elasticity equal to ηn,w = 0.4. Domeij and Floden (2006), however, argue that these
estimates are biased downward due to the omission of borrowing constraints.
10. A sensitivity analysis for m ∈ {1, 2} is provided in the Technical Appendix.
11. This pattern does not hold in the model with government transfers. For low-productivity
workers, these transfers constitute a relatively large part of their disposable income, and, thus, induce
a strong negative income effect. As a result, the age-profile of hours worked for this group lies below
the profile for the medium-productivity workers (see Figure 6 in the Technical Appendix).
12. This result has already been pointed out in a simpler model of the real economy by Huggett
(1996). He finds that we are able to replicate the empirically observable heterogeneity of wealth in
a computable general equilibrium model (except for the very rich households) if we introduce both
life-cycle savings and individual earnings heterogeneity.
13. The responses of output and employment are consistent with the empirical evidence estimated
by Galí (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2005) with a VAR for the U.S. economy. They show that a
supply shock increases output but depresses employment in the first few quarters.
REFERENCES
Altonij, Joseph G. (1986) Intertemporal substitution in labor supply: Evidence from micro data. Journal
of Political Economics 94, S17–S215.
Basu, Susanto and John Fernald (1997) Returns to scale in US production: Estimates and implications.
Journal of Political Economy 105, 249–283.
Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (2004) Some evidence on the importance of sticky prices. Journal of
Political Economy 112, 947–985.
Budrı́a Rodrı́guez, Santiago, Javier Dı́az-Giménez, Vincenzo Quadrini, and José-Vı́ctor Rı́os-
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